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THE NEW PRIVATE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
JULIE A. NICE*
This introductory essay provides the backdrop against which the New
Private Law Symposium developed. It briefly explains our unique symposium
model, which informed much of this volume. In addition, it introduces this
year's topic, the New Private Law, an idea so fresh as to resist definition.
Readers can best understand what we mean by the New Private Law by under-
standing how we came to coin the phrase.
OUR MODEL: DENVER'S CONTEXTUALIZED SYMPOSIUM
Each year members of the University of Denver law faculty select a sym-
posium topic from among common themes we encounter in our work. In this
endeavor, we hold a series of meetings and discuss trends emerging in our
teaching, research, and writing. From among common themes, we select as our
symposium topic a pattern which both relates to and transcends our diverse
contextual interests. We focus our group inquiry on developing the pattern in
context, both to investigate its specific contextual impact and as a grounded
means to explore whether a cross-contextual pattern emerges. Next, we search
for willing travelers to participate in a classic symposium, an intimate round-
table exchange requiring full engagement of all who attend. This format stands
in stark contrast to the experience of many of us, who have attended too many
conferences involving talking heads, sterile audiences, and far too little mean-
ingful engagement. We conduct the symposium through contextualized discus-
sions which ground our examination of how the identified pattern plays out
both in context and across contexts. Our symposium process allows us to do
what legal scholars do best, identifying broad patterns in the development of
law in society, analyzing them, and when necessary, giving them names.
OUR TOPIC: EXPLORING THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PRIVATE LAW
As we met to develop a topic for this symposium, one theme repeatedly
emerged: the growing trend toward preferring private ordering over public
governance. The mainstream media had reported about experiments in privatiz-
ing traditionally government institutions such as schools and prisons. Several
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faculty members identified this pattern within their legal contexts, including
the evolution of private labor dispute resolution systems,' the emergence of
techniques for private environmental preservation,2 and the increasing
contractualization of family structures.3
In my work,4 I had observed privatization take hold even in welfare, one
of the most traditionally "public" arenas. In the recent federal welfare reform
legislation, Congress authorized states to provide services through contracts
with charitable, religious, or private organizations.5 Some states and counties
had been experimenting with private contracts prior to this new round of wel-
fare reform.6 Proponents of welfare privatization claim that it costs less be-
cause of greater flexibility, and provides better services because workers re-
ceive performance-based financial incentives.7 Opponents, including unions,
counter that privatization costs more, reduces the quality of services, elimi-
nates expertise, fosters patronage and corruption, and diminishes public ac-
countability.'
Welfare privatization has taken many forms. For example, some states
have used competitive request-for-proposal bidding processes, while others
have relied on a non-competitive single-bidder method.9 Some states contract
with large corporations, while others rely on smaller, local entities." Some
state agencies compete with private bidders for welfare contracts, while others
simply select among private bids." Texas has entertained bids for its contract
to administer welfare from public-private partnerships consisting of Texas
public agencies working in conjunction with major corporations, as well as
from wholly private competitors. 2 In whatever manner Texas and other states
configure their welfare privatization, many states seem firmly committed to
1. See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact
and Legacy, 73 DENV, U. L. REv. 1051 (1996).
2. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1077
(1996).
3. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven,
but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1107 (1996).
4. See JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACrICE
(1997).
5. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
6. Contractors Must Learn Intricate, Varying Procurement Rules to Win Bids, 5 WELFARE
TO WORK (MMI) No. 24, at 380-81 (Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Contractors] (describing welfare
privatization efforts in Texas, Michigan, Connecticut, Maryland, Indiana, and Virginia).
7. Privatization Useful but Risky Tool in Welfare Reform, 4 WELFARE TO WORK (MI) No.
14, at 108-09 (July 31, 1995).
8. See, e.g., AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Government for Sale: An Examination of the Contracting
Out of State and Local Government Services (on file with the author).
9. Contractors, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bidders for the Texas contract include the Texas Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Texas Workforce Commission, Anderson Consulting, Electronic Data Systems, IBM,
Lockheed Martin, and Unisys. See Nina Bernstein, Companies See Profits in Welfare Law, DAL-
LAS MORN. NEWS, Sept. 15, 1996, at 10A; John Carlin, How to Profit from the Poor, INDEPEN-
DENT (London), Sept 29, 1996, at 12; Contractors, supra note 6; Laura Griffin, Nation's Eyes
Turn to Texas, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, July 22, 1996, at 5B.
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the basic notion that private entities can provide welfare services both more
efficiently and effectively than government. 3 This Symposium explores what
the different forms of, and basic commitment to, privatization mean.
Though our inquiry revealed ubiquitous privatization, we approached
privatization as a symposium topic with some trepidation for two reasons: (1)
none of us was an immediate fan of the trend; and (2) some of us were skepti-
cal about its importance in legal scholarship. Some of us viewed the trend as a
political tool of lawmakers, rather than as an identified movement in legal
scholarship. We wondered, nonetheless, whether this trend toward privatization
might represent something more than a new technique of the political right.
Might it also constitute a legal movement that could be characterized as New
Private Law? If so, what are the movement's attributes? How can it best be
situated within legal discourse?
To capture the gist of our conversations, we coined the phrase "New
Private Law"' 4 and began our attempt to identify what it is. The primary
characteristics of New Private Law include deregulation, decentralization,
privatization, and contractualization. New Private Law reflects a normative
regime which both recognizes a distinction between public and private do-
mains and prefers the ordering of the private market to that of public
decisionmakers. The preference for the "private" seems, at a minimum, to
tolerate inequality and, perhaps, to reify existing power hierarchies.
In a broad-stroke attempt to situate our inquiry within the tradition of
legal discourse, we began to compare New Private Law to recognized jurispru-
dential schools. Initially, we assumed that New Private Law shared the conser-
vative values underlying jurisprudential movements more typically associated
with the political right. We speculated that New Private Law could be an
outgrowth of Formalism and Law and Economics (see Table 1). Specifically,
it seemed to share core values with both Formalism and Law and Economics,
especially a commitment to an individualist, pluralist, liberal ideal. Some of us
were struck, however, by differences between New Private Law and these
existing schools of thought. For example, New Private Law rejects
Formalism's devotion to rules and categories. Unlike Law and Economics, it
13. The confidence in privatization may be premature. In a recent comparison of three states'
private and public child support collection performances, for example, one study concluded that
"because full-service privatization of child support enforcement is relatively new, the extent to
which it offers comparable performance and cost-effectiveness remains an issue for additional
evaluation over the long term." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMrrEE ON THE BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PUB. NO. GAO/HEHS-
97-4, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: EARLY RESULTS ON COMPARABILITY OF PRIVATIZED AND
PUBLIC OFFICES 16 (1996). The study included specific findings of mixed performances:
The relative cost-effectiveness of the privatized versus public offices, however, differed
among the comparisons we made. Specifically, Virginia's and Arizona's privatized offic-
es were more cost-effective---60 percent and 18 percent, respectively---than their public
counterparts. However, in Tennessee, one public office was 52 percent more cost-effec-
tive than the privatized office we reviewed, while the remaining privatized office in
Tennessee was about as cost-effective as its public counterpart.
Id. at 2-3.
14. We were particularly inspired by the Michigan Law Review's Symposium on the New
Public Law. See Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991).
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seems less concerned with efficiency and more concerned with whether an
activity is conducted by the private sphere (see Table 2).
TABLE I
NEW PRIVATE LAW AS CONSERVATIVE OUTGROWTH
FORMALISM REALISM
LPROCESS
L AW & ECONOMICSO I CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIESII -
NEW
NEW PRIVATE LAW ? PUBLICLAW
TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF FORMALISM, LAW AND ECONOMICS,
AND NEW PRIVATE LAW
FORMALISM 5
















Efficiency Baseline P Privatization
Baseline
We compared New Private Law with the centrist legal movements which
had attempted to synthesize values from both the political left and right. For
example, in the simplest terms, mid-twentieth century Legal Process thinkers
criticized Formalism as too conservative and Realism as too politicizing. 6
They devoted themselves to process and institutional competence as the solu-
15. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as
a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 717 (1991) (adapted from Table 1: Common
Law Formalism, Legal Realism, and Legal Process and Table 2: From Common Law Formalism
to the New Public Law).
16. See, e.g., Id. at 709-10.
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tion to these faults. More recently, New Public Law scholars similarly criti-
cized Law and Economics as too conservative and Critical Legal Studies as
too politicizing." The New Public Law scholars responded to these perceived
extremes by devoting themselves to normativism and pragmatism as the solu-
tion to these faults. Our comparisons between the New Private Law, Legal
Process, and New Public Law yielded several additional queries. Is the New
Private Law a synthesis between Law and Economics and Critical Legal Stud-
ies? If so, could the New Private Law be the conservative-oriented centrist
response to the polarization between Law and Economics and Critical Legal
Studies, as New Public Law may be the progressive-oriented centrist response
(see Table 3)?
TABLE 3
NEW PRIVATE LAW AS CENTRIST SYNTHESIS
FORMASM REALISM
LEGAL PROCESS -
LAW & ECONOMICS I CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
afw E NEW o
IPRIVATEI PUBLIC
LAW LAW
How do New Private Law and New Public Law compare? Certainly New
Public Law and New Private Law share several characteristics: both seem
simultaneously normative and pragmatic (see Table 4). But they seem commit-
ted to different fundamental values. New Public Law seems more committed
to values of community and equality, while New Private Law seems more
committed to values of individualism and market integrity. Other questions
seem more difficult to call. For example, to what extent do they comparatively
tend to reinforce extant power relations?
17. Id. at 725-26.
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TABLE 4:
CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW PRIVATE LAW AND NEW PUBLIC LAW
NEW PRIVATE LAW NEW PUBLIC LAW"
Deregulation, Decentralization, New Forms of Regulation, or
Privatization, Contractualization Deregulation




• Market Values ' Nonmarket Values
Liberty • Equality
This Symposium issue explores the potential of the New Private Law and
related questions through the contextualized analyses which follow. First, Gary
Peller 9 and Dan Farber20 explore privatization with a focus on public school
administration. In the context of labor law, Katherine Van Wezel Stone2 ex-
plores the danger to employees when labor and employment disputes are pri-
vatized. Roberto Corrada22 and Dennis Lynch23 comment on Professor
Stone's cautionary tale. In the context of environmental law, Federico
Cheever 4 explores the use of land trusts as progressive tools toward conser-
vation, on which Richard Collins25 comments. In the context of sexual regu-
lation, Martha Ertman 6 provides a model for charting privatization as a way
station on the road to progressive protection for those she identifies as sexual
marginorities, followed by a comment from Mary Becker.27 On a broader
level, Clayton Gillette2" explores the potential competition between public and
private provision of goods and services, with a response by Elaine Welle.29
18. See id. at 744 (adapted from Table 2: From Common Law Formalism to the New Public
Law).
19. Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the
New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996).
20. Daniel A. Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011 (1996).
21. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
22. Corrada, supra note 1.
23. Dennis 0. Lynch, Conceptualizing Forum Selection as a "Public Good": A Response to
Professor Stone, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1071 (1996).
24. Cheever, supra note 2.
25. Richard B. Collins, Alienation of Conservation Easements, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1103
(1996).
26. Ertman, supra note 3.
27. Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENv. U. L. REv.
1169 (1996).
28. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1185 (1996).
29. Elaine A. Welle, Opting Out of Public Provision: Constraints and Policy Considerations,
73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1221 (1996).
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Finally, Nancy Ehrenreich3" explores the potential of privatization and Alan
Chen" critiques the existence and potential of New Private Law.
This Symposium accomplishes several objectives. It addresses an
overarching topic and captures it in context. It considers whether a New Pri-
vate Law exists, and if so, what characteristics define it. Finally, it examines
who benefits from a New Private Law: suggesting that while privatization may
generally benefit powerful parties, it may benefit less powerful actors as well.
If the legal and social developments that led us to name the New Private Law
continue, we hope the provocative ideas in this Symposium will provide a
foundation for further exploration of its significance.
30. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1235
(1996).
31. Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1253 (1996).
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